
Critical Intelligence Problems Committee Chairman - Eloise R. Page

- The present Critical Intelligence Problems Committee (CIPC) was reconstituted in January 1983. The CIPC is now organized as a standing senior interagency committee for the primary purpose of focusing the Intelligence Community's attention and expertise on high-interest, cross-disciplinary intelligence problems. The Committee is charged with the responsibility to examine critical intelligence problems, as identified by the DCI, DDCI and the Intelligence Community, and provide timely assessments and specific recommendations for improving the overall performance of NFIP systems, activities and programs, reporting, dissemination and analysis. To accomplish these tasks in a timely and efficient manner, senior committee membership is obviously required. Attached is a matrix reflecting the current CIPC membership.
- Although the Committee has been in existence for less than one year, our accomplishments to date are noteworthy. For example, the Committee initiated a major study effort on the Soviet Strategic Cruise Missile Problem. To facilitate the study effort and to identify priority resource requirements for the FY-85 budget, the Committee established a Cruise Missile Working Group consisting of 12 Intelligence Community organizations—including the collection and production committees—having a direct interest in this problem. The Working Group has completed its study on this subject, and identified 44 recommendations for enhancing our collection efforts against this very difficult intelligence problem. The study was forwarded to you on 9 November with the recommendation that you table the study at a forthcoming NFIC meeting.
- Concurrently, the Committee has a major study effort under way on the International Narcotics Problem. The purpose of this effort is to assess the adequacy of intelligence support to the US international narcotics control effort. We also established an interagency working group—17 intelligence and law enforcement organizations are participating, to include the collection and production committees—to study this complicated problem. The CIPC just recently approved the working group's study which contained 54 recommendations, and noted that it was an impressive and a quality report.
- Another significant accomplishment of the Committee was the establishment of a national-level organization to manage the Collection Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT). After a careful review of this subject the Committee concluded that this category of intelligence warranted a unique forum and that a subcommittee, under the auspices of the SIGINT Committee, should be established. The DDCI approved this recommendation and it has been implemented.
- We think we have established a capability within the CIPC staff to manage a number of difficult intelligence problems concurrently, and have already been tested. Community reaction to the Cruise Missile and Narcotic Studies has been positive and complimentary. However, your continued support and recommendations to senior U. S. Government officials to utilize the expertise of this DCI Committee will facilitate and enhance our capability to provide quality management to the substantive areas with which you have charged us. Finally, we are enthusiastic over our new responsibility to conduct assessments and evaluations of collection strategy mixes against national intelligence needs. We feel confident that we can establish a mechanism that will provide you and the Intelligence Community the required information for making comprehensive and sound resource decisions.

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ISSUE: Means for Assessing Overall Intelligence Community Performance and Evaluating the Effectiveness of Collection System Mixes Against National Intelligence Information Needs

COMMENTS:

- Recent attempts to develop a means to assess Community performance in fulfilling national intelligence needs and to evaluate the collection mix have foundered for lack of valid technical criteria or acceptable operational models useful to the decisionmakers.
- o Evaluations limited in scope to individual collection systems or mixes have been reasonably successful

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mechanism for assessment and evaluation of capabilities that usefully support NFIC resource decisions has not been satisfactorily developed.

The Capabilities Program and Budget System has produced limited but useful Target/Topic evaluations that begin to relate overall Community performance and capabilities to perceived needs and projected future capabilities. The Overview Volume of the Congressional Budget Justification Book illustrates this approach and demonstrates the potential for utility with further refinement.

TASK:

To establish a mechanism for assessment and evaluation of Intelligence Community performance in fulfilling national intelligence needs. The mechanism must have the full support and participation of the Intelligence Community.

PROCEDURE

The CIPC, supported by the: DCI Collection Committees; the PBS, PPS, and other ICS elements; IPC; and an ad hoc group composed of Senior officials representing the NFIC principals, is responsible for developing on an annual basis an assessment and evaluation of:

The status of our foreign positive intelligence effort in general for each Target/Topic area.

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
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- The relative impact of present and projected shortfalls within and across Target/Topic areas.
- o The extent to which each collection/processing/production program (present, programmed, developmental) within each collection discipline does or could contribute to our continuing needs and present or projected shortfalls.
- o The nature of the NFIP funding profile over the long term.

This evaluation will be submitted to NFIB and NFIC for substantive and programmatic review, and to the SIG(I) to ensure a balanced perspective.

Based on the above four elements of the CIPC undertaking, the SIGINT Committee and COMIREX, in cooperation with NSA and SAFSS, will prepare a detailed time-phased plan to develop system-specific mix assessment methodologies based on their individual tasking and performance simulations. Each will propose independent mix assessment models geared to develop, as a minimum, a performance evaluation methodology that, by incorporating CIPC evaluation results, will be useful to the NFIC in system mix investment decisions.

A detailed plan will be distributed for your review and comment by 15 November. Although tentative, this process must lead to an annual NFIC process that produces a more satisfactory decisionmaking mechanism.



Critical	Intelligence	Problems	Committee
Vice	Chairman -		

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- 1. The current DCI's Critical Intelligence Problems Committee (CIPC) was formed effective 6 April 1983 as a standing senior interagency committee for the purpose of focusing Intelligence Community attention and expertise on high-interest, cross-disciplinary intelligence problems. Charged with providing timely assessments and specific recommendations for improvements in the overall performance of NFIP programs, the CIPC's membership is sufficiently senior (e.g., Executive Director/CIA, Deputy Director/NSA, service intelligence chiefs, etc.), to ensure that ample working resources from individual agencies/departments are devoted to solving a given problem and that recommended actions are taken in a timely and thorough manner. During its seven months of existence the CIPC has addressed two significant and complicated issues and produced The Soviet Strategic Cruise Missile Study and The International Narcotics Coordination and Collection Study. We have also examined a variety of less complex issues, including one which resulted in the establishment of the new MASINT sub-committee of the SIGINT Committee. We are currently beginning a detailed review of how to improve the intelligence posture on certain aspects of the PRC problem.
- 2. It is difficult, because of its brief existence, to assess with certainty just how well the CIPC is functioning and what impact it has had. The nature of its operation and the types of major recommendations it is likely to make are tied in many respects to the budget process and the acquisition and/or the reallocation of resources; both of these processes by their nature require time to implement and evaluate. A precise measure of results will be better accomplished in one to two years. It can be stated, however, that both the cruise missile and narcotics reports have been extremely well received by the CIPC membership and others who have seen them. It appears to us, at this point, that significant progress has been made over the brief life of this committee; and we are most optimistic regarding potential future contributions.
- 3. We think we have built a capability within the CIPC staff to manage a number of difficult problems at the same time. Our senior committee membership has been helpful in bringing some matters to our attention; other issues were inherited when we were formed. I think, however, that outside of a fairly small circle of individuals, our visibility within the intelligence structure has not been high, particularly in areas like the NSC, the PFIAB, and the Congress. Our reputation will probably grow as our reports become more widely circulated (the cruise missile report has been suggested as a discussion topic for an early NFIC meeting), but we could benefit both from some direct tasking from you and from any personal backing that you may care to give our efforts.

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Washington, D.C 20505

DCI/ICS 83-3856B 9 November 1983

Critical Intelligence Problems Committee

MEMORANDUM FOR:	Deputy Director for Central Intelligence	
VIA:	Deputy Director, Intelligence Community Staff	
FROM:	Vice Chairman	25 X ′
SUBJECT:	CIPC Monthly ReportOctober 1983 (U)	
and was chaired the Narcotics Wo Coordination and	gularly scheduled monthly meeting was held on 11 October 1983, by Miss Eloise R. Page, DD/ICS. The primary agenda item was orking Group Report entitled "The International Narcotics d Collection Study."	25 X 1
Narcotics Activi		
complimented the impressive and a contained in the instances where	egard to the Narcotics Study, the CIPC principals highly study and noted that it was a prodigious effort, that it was a quality report. In addressing the 54 recommendations study, the members endorsed the recommendations and cited they had already implemented some of the recommendations ir organizational responsibility.	25X′
3. 'The mem to specific Inte	nbers also noted that the study made a significant contribution elligence Community concerns relative to:	
the need on the p	I for an authoritative statement of national policy priorities assigned to narcotics intelligence;	
the need	I to address issues related to resource implication; and	
the need on Intel activiti	I to clarify ambiguities concerning legal constraints ligence Community support to Federal law enforcement es.	25 X ′
formal approval that is presentl drug enforcement subject will be	the committee endorsed the Narcotics Study, they withheld pending the results of the Narcotics Working Group's subpanel y studying how classified intelligence can be used to support while concurrently protecting sources and methods. This the primary agenda item at our November CIPC meeting and the	25X ²
results Will De	incorporated into the final Narcotics Study.	201
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5. During the month, the subpanel convened several times to consider the use of classified information for drug enforcement support. A number of tentative conclusions and recommendations have been made: however, we do not expect a final report until next month.	25 X 1
Narcotics published last August. All the service intelligence components, as well as the DIA, have indicated their willingness to respond to increased tasking on narcotics intelligence objectives. Non-NFIB agencies have all been positive and have included detailed comments from such diverse elements as the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the Federal Reserve System, Customs, and the US Coast Guard. On the whole, the letters form a solid basis for a systematic evaluation of collection accountability. A draft response is being	25 X 1
Coordinators Conterence in Madrid from 11-12 October 1983, and chaired a panel discussion on intelligence support for the US international narcotics control effort. The presentation took account of where the Intelligence Community stood a year ago on the issue of intelligence support; the accomplishments achieved over the past year; and the major observations and insights gained as a result of the CIPC's effort in developing a narcotics intelligence coordination and support study. In addition, emphasis was given to the two central issues which affected the development of the narcotics study, i.e., (1) the question of which aspect of narcotics control strategy should receive priority in intelligence support, and (2) how far national intelligence capabilities can go in support of law enforcement activities. 8. The intelligence presentation was attended by the Attorney General, Bud Mullen, DEA, and RADM Norman Venzke, USCG. The Attorney General participated fully in the question-and-answer period and focused his remarks on the cooperation that was developing between the Intelligence Community and	25X1 25X1
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Strategic Cruise Missile Study	
10. The Strategic Cruise Missile Study has been finalized, and we are in the process of forwarding it to you with the recommendation that it be tabled and discussed at a forthcoming NFIC meeting.	25 X 1
11. Additionally, at the request of the CIPC principals, we are in the process of developing a sanitized version of the report at the SI/TK level. The committee has characterized the study as making a highly technical subject intelligible to the non-specialist audience, and the committee is anxious to	
give the study the broadest possible distribution.	25 X 1
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